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MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY

Alla,:z F. Smith*
I
THE PROBLEM OF MUNICIPAL TORTS

M In

UNICIPAL government in the United States is big business.
1946, the 397 cities having a population of 25,000 or
more spent a total of nearly -3 billion dollars for general governmental
expenditures.1 In 1947 the total increased by 17 per cent to $3,477,000,000.2 Of that amount, 2½ billion were actual operational expenses
for such activities as public safety, public health, sanitation, hospitals,
local street and highway maintenance, and schools.3 Since the figures
do not include the amounts expended in connection with municipal
water works or municipal street railways,4 they lend weight to the
assertion that our municipal governments are today engaged in a variety
of activities which, in the aggregate, are of considerable magnitude. cs
These activities are, of course, designed to improve the welfare of
the inhabitants of the respective communities. That they might be
more successful, that the activities might be broadened in their scope,
and that the areas of activity differ materially from place to place may
be admitted. Our only concern here is that cities do engage in numerous activities, and with the inevitable consequence that some individuals will suffer harm as a result. It is from this fact and its consequence
that the problem of municipal tort liability arises. The agents and
,. Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed.
BUREAu oF CENsus, CoMPENDmM OF CITY GoVERNMENT FrN.ANCEs IN 1946 at
p. 2 (1947). It may be noted that the 397 cities accounted "for well over a third (35.2%)
of the general revenue of all local governments in the United States and over one-half
(52.8%) of all local public debt. Of the general revenue of all 16,220 municipalities
in the nation, the 397 largest received 81.9%; they accounted for 86.3% of total city debt."
Id. at 2.
2 BUREAU OF CENsus:
SUMMARY OF C1TY GOVERNMENT Fm.ANCEs IN 1947 at
p. 6 (1948).
3 Id. at p. 7. The figure does not include all of the money spent for schools, because
in some cities school finances are handled through separate independent corporations.
4 Id. at p. 3. The operating revenue derived from such enterprises in 1946 was about
$763,000,000. CoMPENDIUM oF CITY GOVERNMENT Fm.ANcEs IN 1946 at 3 (1947).
5 By way of comparison with private enterprises which are spread across the country
and operate a large number of plants, it may be noted that F. W. Woolworth's limited
price variety stores had a total operating revenue in 1947 of only $593,359,194. MoonY"s
INVESTMENT REPORTS (lNDusTRIALs) 2254 (1948). Westinghouse Electric's operating
revenue for 1947 was only $814,660,605. Id at 1675.
1
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employees of the city succeed in a large measure in their efforts to
improve the welfare of the inhabitants, but inevitably, either through
human carelessness or even carefulness, either through active wrongdoing or through non-action when action is required, or, perhaps,
through exercise of judgment. which eventually proves to have been
mistaken, they will cause damage to some member of the community
whom they were trying to help. A policeman, trying to preserve peace
and order by arresting an escaping felon, fires a bullet intended to halt
the flight. 6 Regardless of the care he may use, the bullet may injure
an innocent passerby. 7 The driver of a firetruck, hastening to carry
equipment which will prevent a devastating conB.agration, may hit a
car or a pedestrian. 8 - The garbageman, trying to assist in preserving
the health of the community, may negligently park his truck in such
a way that injury results.9 Or, the city may attempt to -dispose of
accumulated garbage by burning it in an outlying area only to find
that th~ smoke and fumes prevented use of a nearby school.1° The
attendant at a municipal swimming pool may negligently open the gates
which drain the pool with resultant injury to bathers.11 Injury may
arise not· because the swimming pool attendant was -negligent, but
because the city council ordered the Hoor of the pool to be so constructed that it was necessarily unsafe when the pool was used for
diving.12 The city council constructs a municipal water plant and
conscientiously decides that the water mains need be only eight inches
in diameter. Subsequently, it is discovered that the amount of water
thus made available is insufficient to serve the area and that the main
should h~ve been twelve inches in diameter.13 These, and innumerable
6 Evans v. Berry, 262 N.Y. 61, _186 N.E. 203 (1933). See also State v. St. Louis,
174 Mo. 125, 73 S.W. 623 (1903) (policeman injured child while attempting to kill a
Eull loose in a populated area); Looney v. Sioux City, 163 Iowa 604, 145 N.W. 287 (1914)
(policeman wrongfully shot his prisoner); Jones v. New Orleans, 143 La. 1073, 79 S. 865
(1918) (negligent shooting in protecting property); Whitfield v. Paris, 84 Tex. 431, 19
S.W. 566 (1892) (negligently shot bystander while attempting to kill unmuzzled dog).
7 If negligent, liability is, of course, clear.
SSee 110 A.L.R. 1117 (1937).
9E,g., Boyd v. Knoxville, 171 Tenn. 401, 104 S.W. (2d) 419 (1937). See generally,
for injuries resulting from carrying out this municipal activity, 14 A.L.R. 1473 (1921),
60 A.L.R. 101 (1929), 110 A.L.R. 1117, 1127 (1937); 6 McQm=, MUNICIPAL CoRPORATIONs, 2nd ed.~ §§2807, 2840 (1928).
10 Smith v. Ann Arbor, 303 Mich. 476, 7 N.W. (2d) 752 (1942).
llMola v. Metropolitan Park District, 181 Wash. 177, 42 P. (2d) 435 (1935).
12 Hair v. Lynchburg, 165 Va. 78, 181 S.E. 285 (1935).
13 Stansbury v. Richmond, 116 Va. 205, 81 S.E. 26 (1914). Cf. Willson v. Boise
City, 20 Idaho 133, 117 P. 115 (1911) (where no injury would have resulted had it not
been for the construction· of the public improvement) and King v. Granger, 21 R.I. 93,
41 A. 1012 (1898) (where injury resulted from action of the city which overtaxed existing facilities).
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other cases which might be recounted, indicate the nature of the
problem: how far should a municipality be compelled to respond in
damages to individuals who suffer harm as a result of activities undertaken by the municipality?

II
THE CuRR.ENT DocTRINE OF MuNICIPAL IMMUNITY
No attempt will be made to trace the history of the doctrines which
are currently applied in the United States. One author has stated
that they arose as a result of "a combination of misguided logic and
misapplied precedent."14 Be that as it may, at the present time, courts
of this country are attempting to delineate the area of municipal responsibility by application of a verbal formula which may be stated quite
simply: a municipal corporation is liable for torts committed by its
agents in the performance of private, proprietary, corporate or ministerial
functions but, in the absence of statute, is not responsible for torts
committed in the performance of governmental functions. 15 The governmental functions are sometimes referred to as_ public functions or
political functions, and the same general idea is sometimes expressed
by the courts with the statement that the municipal corporation is
immune from liability when it is acting as an agent of the state. This
classic statement of a so-called principle may well be regarded as the
distinctive characteristic of the doctrine relating to municipal liability;
it is this particular aspect that I shall discuss primarily. It is a rare
judicial opinion which does not, at a very early point, pay lip-homage
to that formula, proceed from that point to classify the particular function being performed and then conclude that liability or immunity
follows from that classification. Those who appreciate the tautology
that may be involved in such reasoning know that lawyers and judges
alike may be prone to decide first whether liability should be imposed
(a decision reached by considering such factor~ as the extent of the
injury, the palpability of the neglect which occasioned it, whether the
14 Barnett, ''The Foundations of the Distinction Between Public and Private Functions
in Respect to the Common-Law Tort Liability of Municipal Corporations," 16 ORI!. L. REv.
250 (1937).
15 This distinction has been reiterated in so many cases and by so many textwriters
and commentators that citation of authority is hardly necessary. A criticism of the doctrine
is found in Seasongood, "Municipal Corporations: Objections to the Governmental or
Proprietary Test," 22 VA. L. REv. 910 (1936) and Borchard, "Government Liability in
Tort," 34 YALB L. J. 129, 229 (1924-5).
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imposition liability would seriously hamper the ordinary administration of the city's business, whether the harm resulted from non-feasance
or misfeasance, from a carefully considered legislative act or from the
carelessness of an employee) and then express their result by classifying
the function as governmental or proprietary. The actual opinion thus
represents an inversion of the mental process by which the decision
was reached, and all too frequently it omits any real statement of the
factors which inHuenced the court to impose liability or to grant immunity. When one reads any opinion,- it is usually appropriate to
inquire whether the city is immune because the function is governmental or whether the function is governmental because the city should
be immune.
The results of such a doctrine have been rather startling. With few
exceptions, the same function has been called governmental by the
courts of one state, and proprietary by those of another.16 No further
proof should be required to demonstrate that there is nothing inherent
in particular functions by which they can be classified.17 _ Too often,
courts review their own decisions and come to the same conclusion as
did the Illinois court: "All that can be done with safety is to determine
each case as it arises."18 Many specific distinctions may be cited which
have resulted from a mechanical application of the formula. In Bay
City, Michigan, an employee of a telephone company was killed because of negligence of the city's agents in maintaining electric wires. The city's electric light plant furnished direct current for the purpose
of lighting the streets and public buildings. It sold alternating current
_ to inhabitants for use in their homes. It was held that since the injury
resulted from negligence in maintaining the wires carrying alternating
current,. which· was sold for profit, the city was liable. The court;stated,
however, that the city would not be liable "for the negligence of its ...
agents ... when furnishing the service for lighting its public streets."19
Thus we distinguish between governmental electricity and proprietary
electricity. In Georgia, when a city engages in furnishing water to
its inhabitants, it is generally said that it acts in a private, proprietary
capacity, and is therefore liable for the negligence of its agents. Yet,
when an employee negligently left open a box leading to the water
16 See Borchard, op. cit., supra, note 15. For collection of cases on various types of
functions see 6 McQaiLLIN, MUNICIPAL CoRPORATIONS, 2d ed., c. 53 (1928); 14 CollN.

L.Q. 351 (1929).
17 See infra, p. 45 for a discussion of refinements.
1s Roumbos v. Chicago, 332 ill. 70, 163 N.E. 36J (1928).
10 Hodgins v. Bay City, 156 Mich. 687, 121 N.W. 274 (1909).
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pipes which supplied water to a p·ool in a public park, the court declared that there was no liability.20 We must, then, distinguish between proprietary manholes and governmental manholes. The tendency
of courts to emphasize the element of profit being made by the municipal corporation leads to speculation as to what the result might be
where the city, as a community enterprise, collects certain kinds of
garbage without charge, but makes a charge for collection of other
kinds. No doubt it might be argued that a distinction must be made
between proprietary garbage and governmental garbage.21
'
Certain refinements have been introduced by the courts to alleviate
the harshness which results from the doctrine of municipal immunity.
Without attempting to elaborate upon them, I shall point out some
such refinements which are in more or less general use. First, if the
conduct of the city is such that it can be said to be a nuisance, most
courts will compel the city to cease its conduct and to respond in damages for injuries to property which may have resulted. 22 There is some
authority that personal injuries must be compensated for if they arise
as a result of the maintenance of a nuisance. 23 A Florida decision even
permitted recovery against a city for damages arising out of the conduct
of the fire chief speeding to a fire on the ground that his conduct constituted the maintenance of a nuisance on the public streets.24 Second,
several courts have discovered that in carrying out some broad governmental functions, municipal employees may be performing only "ministerial" acts, and have compelled the city to assume the burdens which
How from the negligent performance of such acts. Thus, while activities of the police force may generally be governmental, the man who
drives the car to deliver the policemen to their respective beats is performing a ministerial act. 25 Third, there is some inclination on the part
of the courts to distinguish negligent conduct of agents from negligent
maintenance of property, and impose liability upon the city for the lat20 Autrey v. City Council of Augusta, 33 Ga. App. 757, 127 S.E. 796 (1925).
Cf. City Council of Augusta v. Cleveland, 23 Ga. App. 522, 98 S.E. 738 (1919).
21 For cases dealing with municipal liability for torts in which some notable distinctions are drawn, see: Ashbury v. Norfolk, 152 Va. 278, 147 S.E. 223 (1929); Louisville
v. Hehemann, 161 Ky. 523, 171 S.W. 165 (1914); Montain v. Fargo, 38 N.D. 432,
166 N.W. 416 (1917); Nashville v. Mason, 137 Tenn. 169, 192 S.W. 915 (1916).
22E.g., Oklahoma City v. Tytenicz, 171 Okla. 519, 43 P. (2d) 747 (1935); Windle
v. Springfield, 320 Mo. 459, 8 S.W. (2d) 61 (1928); Capozzi v. Waterbury, 115 Conn.
107, 160 A. 435 (1932).
23 Hoffman v. Bristol, 113 Conn. 386, 155 A. 499 (1931). Contra: Virovatz v. City
of Cudahy, 211 Wis. 357, 247 N.W. 341 (1933).
24 Maxwell v. Miami, 87 Fla. 107, 100 S. 147 (1924); Tallahassee v. Kaufman, 87
Fla. 119, 100 S. 150 (1924).
25 Jones v. Sioux City, 185 Iowa 1178, 170 N.W. 445 (1919).
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ter neglect even though the property is devoted to a so-called public or
governmental purpose. 26 Fourth, the courts have permitted cities to
assume some- responsibility for harm to individuals, by allowing them,
under a power to pay equitable claims, to make an appropriation directly
to the injured individual or indirectly by reimbursing the employee
who has been personally charged with liability. 27 This method of
handling tort claims, however, is not only cumbersome and time-consuming, but leaves the question of responsibility to be settled by the
whim of the city council rather than by the establishment of general
principles of law.28
The foregoing refinements do not cut the underbrush cleanly away.
Indeed, whenever a court makes an attempt to break completely away
. from the doctrines of immunity, and perhaps succeeds in a particular
case, there is usually a quick withdrawal from such advanced position.29
26 E.g., Kies v. City of Erie, 169 Pa. 598, 32 A. 621 (1895).
27 Most, though not all courts, will now concede that such expenditures

constitute a
proper use of municipal funds and are not to be classed as forbidden gratuities. lliustra- ·
tive of cases in which the city has reimbursed its officials against whom judgment has been
rendered are: Sherman v. Carr, 8 R.I. 431 (1867); Hixon v. Sharon, 190 Mass. 347, 76
N.E. 909 (1916); State v. St. Louis, 174 Mo. 125, 73 S.W. 623 (1903). Direct contribution was upheld in Evans v. Ben:y, 262 N.Y. 61, 186 N.E. 203 (1933). See 42 YALE L.J.
241 (1932).
An analogous question arises when the city attempts to appropriate funds to employ
counsel to defend actions brought against city officials. See Corsicana v. Babb (Tex. Civ.
App.) 266 S.W. 196 (1924), criticized in 23 MICH. L. REv. 666 (1925); Leonard v.
Middleborough, 198 Mass. 221, 84 N.E. 323 (1908), 21 HARv. L. REv. 625 (1908);
130 A.L.R. 736 (1941).
2 8 That the city, even though authorized to appropriate money for defense of its officials, cannot be compelled to pay, see Gormly v. Town of Mt. Vernon,_ 134 Iowa 394,
108 N.W. 465 (1906); Sherman v. Carr, 8 R.I. 431 (1867), "It would seem .•• to be
wisest to leave the indemnification of the officer to the discretion of those who represent
the interests of the city•••." Cf. Barnett v. Paterson, 48 N.J.L. 395, 6 A. 15 (1886);
Wiley v. Seattle, 7 Wash. 576, 35 P. 415 (1894).
On the national level, the desire to eliminate settlement of tort claims through private
legislation (at great expense of legislators' time) seems to have been one of the dominating
factors which led to the adoption of the Federal Tort Claims Act. 60 Stat. L. 842 (1946),
28 U.S.C.A. (1948) §§2671-2680. It was included in the Legislative Reorganization Act
of 1946, 60 Stat. L. 812, and S. REP. lOll, 79th Cong., 2d sess., p. 25 (1946) indicates
that the committee was aware of the inefficiency of handling private claims by legislation:
''This method of handling individual claims does not work well either for the government
or for the individual claimant, while the cost of legislating the settlement in many cases far
exceeds the total amounts involved." As to the number of claims handled in this way prior
tc the Federal Tort Claims Act, see Holtzoff, "The Handling of Tort Claims Against the
Federal Government," 9 LAw AND CoNTEM, PROB. 3ll (1942); S. REP. 1400, 7th Cong.,
2d sess., p. 30 (1946).
20 For example, Fowler v. Cleveland, 100 Ohio St. 158, 126 N.E. 72 (1919) overruled in Aldrich v. Youngstown, 106 Ohio St. 342, 140 N.E. 164 (1922); Miller v. Manistee County Road Commrs., 297 Mich. 487, 298 N.W. 105 (1941) overruled in Mead v.
Mich. Public Service Comm., 303 Mich. 168, 5 N.W. (2d) 740 (1942). The Michigan
legislature later abolished the defense of "governmental function" in automobile negligence
actions against the state. Act No. 237, Pub. Acts of 1943, amended by Act No. 87,
Pub. Acts of 1945; Mich. Comp. Laws (1948) §691.141.
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Real progress can be made in a revaluation of the problem only through
legislation.30 On the credit side of the ledger, some notable steps have
been taken in recent years. On the national level, the federal government in 1946 adopted the Federal Tort Claims Act31 which opened
the courts to a substantial number of litigants theretofore dependent
upon the willingness of Congress to make special appropriation. On
the state level, New York has enacted legislation32 which for a while
seemed destined to eliminate the possibility of cities :finding immunity
on the ground that a governmental function is involved.33 The courts,
however, still seeking an appropriate safeguard against municipal bankruptcy, have reinstated the distinction in a different form. 34 No other
state has gone so far, but many states have waived their immunity in
particular areas of activity.35 Thus, the widespread use of the automobile awakened legislators to the realization that harm might result
from the use of vehicles and that the loss should be borne not by the
injured party but by the community as a whole. Statutes waiving
immunity in this limited area have appeared quite frequently. 36 So, too,
while the maintenance of streets and sidewalks is frequently classified
as a local or ministerial function so that liability is imposed without
statutory assistance,37 there are statutes which have speci:6.cally waived
the immunity in this area of activity.38 There is some indication that
a large percentage of the injuries suffered by individuals as a result .of
municipal activities, arise from proprietary activities, or from the operation of motor vehicles and from defective streets.39 It might be argued
30 Lloyd, "Municipal Tort Liability in New York-A Legislative Challenge," 23

N.Y. Umv. L.Q. 278 (1948); Borchard, ''Proposed State and Local Statutes Imposing
Public Liability in Tort," 9 LAw AND CoNTEM, PRoB. 282 (1942).
3160 Stat. L. 842 (1946), 28 U.S.C.A. (1948) §§2671-2680.
32 Sec. 8, Court of Claims Act, N.Y. Laws (1939) c. 860, §8.
aa Bernadine v. New York City, 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E. (2d) 604 (1945); Schmid v.
Werner, 188 Misc. 718, 72 N.Y.S. (2d) 361 (1947).
3 4 See Steitz v. Beacon, 295 N.Y. 51, 64 N.E. (2d) 704 (1945) and Murrain v.
Wilson Line and New York City, 270 App. Div. 372, 59 N.Y.S. (2d) 750 (1946),
affd. 296 N.Y. 845, 72 N.E. (2d) 29 (1947). See Lloyd, "Le Roi Est Mort; Vive Le
Roi," 24 N.Y. Umv. L.Q. 38 (1949); 161 A.L.R. 367 (1946).
85 See Tooke, "The Extension of Municipal Liability in Tort," 19 VA. L. REv. 97
(1932).
86E.g., Cal. Stat. (1931) c. 122, §1714½; ill. Laws (1931) p. 618, §1; N.Y. Laws
(1940) c. 687, §50b; Wis. Laws (1929) c. 77. See 85 A.L.R. 696 (1933); 89 A.L.R.
394 (1934).
87 See 25 AM. Jun., Highways §348. A criticism is found in Borchard, "Government
Liability in Tort," 34 YALE L.J. 229 (1925). For good discussion of the tactics of the
lliinois court.in imposing liability when a "street" injury is involved, see Green, "Freedom
of Litigation: III," 38 Ju.. L. REv. 355 (1944).
88 See 25 AM. Jun., Highways §349, n. 16.
89 Warp, "Tort Liabilities of Small Municipalities," 9 LAw AND CoNTEM, PROB.
363 (1942).
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that nothing further need be done. To me it seems that the exact opposite conclusion should be drawn: that if-most of the responsibility has
been accepted without serious impairment of municipal activities, there
is no excuse for not completing the eradication of the doctrine of immunity. 40

III
SocIAL ETI-IICS OF THE DocTRINB OF IMMUNITY

For more than a generation, commentators and textwriters have
relentlessly and unanimously urged that the government assume a
greater responsibility in tort,41 and much of their discussion has been
directed particularly toward the immunity of the municipal corporation. 42 -The social climate which fostered the growth of absolutism
and the divine right of kings in England has long since been tempered
with the warm winds of humanitarianism and individual freedom.
The changes which have occurred in the last century with respect to
the imposition of liability upon private corporate enterprises of any
kind are well-known. Workmen's compensation laws have replaced
the old theories which permitted the corporate organizations to escape
liability under the fellow-servant rule or the doctrine of assumption of
risk. Liability may now be predicated without fault merely on grounds
that potential injuries to individuals must be calculated as a part of
the cost of doing business, and must be paid for by the business enterprise.43 There is widespread acceptance of a philosophy that those who
enjoy the fruits of the enterprise must also accept its risks and attendant
responsibilities. Unemployment compensation laws have their foundation in a theory that the en~re community must share the burdens of
40 This does not imply that the governme~tal-proprietazy dichotomy can be ignored
in all areas. E.g., the power of the federal government to tax state activities has, until
recently at least, involved the- same distinction. How far the distinction remains valid
is questionable in the light of New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 66 S. Ct. 310
(1946).
41 Many leading articles are cited in Repko, "American Legal Commentary on the
Doctrines of Municipal Tort Liability," 9 LAw AND CoNTEM. PROB. 214 (1942). See
especially: Borchard, "Government Liability in Tprt," 34 YALB L.J. 1, 129, 229 (1924-5);
36 YALB L.J. 1, 757, 1039 (1926-7); 28 CoL. L. REv. 577, 734 (1928); Harno, "Tort
Immunity of Municipal Corporations," 4 lli. L.Q. 28 (1921); Tooke, "The Extension
of Municipal Liability in Tort," 19 VA. L. REv. 97 (1932); Green, "Freedom of Litigation: ill," 38 ILL. L. REv. 355 (1944).
42 See particularly Borchard, "Government Liability in Tort," 34 YALB L.J. 129 (1924)
and Green, ''Freedom of Litigation: ill," 38 Ir.r.. L. REv. 355 (1944).
43 The theory of workmen's compensation laws is discussed in HOROVITZ, INJURY
AND DEATH UNDER WoRKMEN's COMPENSATION LAws pt. 1 (1944); HoBBs, WoRKMEN's
CoMPENSATION lNsURANCE, c. 3 (1939); 1 SCHNEIDER, WoRKMEN's COMPENSATION, 3rd·
ed., c. 1- (1941). That the philosophy may constitutionally be applied to municipal tort liability, see Evans v. Berry, 262 N.Y. 61, 186 N.E. 203 (1933) and cases cited therein.

1949]

49

MUNICIPAL TORT LIABILITY

an economy which does not always supply an outlet for the services
of all those who have services to supply. There is today at least some
agreement that not all of the unemployed are those who are shiftless and
incompetent.44
Why, then, has not the same social philosophy been adopted in the
field of municipal government? Is there any sound reason we should
refuse to acknowledge that the cost of obtaining governmental services includes the cost of injuries which arise from governmental activities? Functions commonly regarded as governmental are undertaken
for the benefit of all members of the community. Should not all members of the community assume a proportionate share of the responsibility for the injuries which result from the carrying out of those functions? For example, everyone wants and expects an efficient police department charged with the responsibility of enforcing agreed standards
of conduct. Inevitably our representatives in the police department will
visit harm upon some innocent members of the community. Must the
injured citizen contribute that additional amount toward the preservation of the police department, or shall the entire community assume
the responsibility for that loss suffered by one of its members? Few
persons will insist upon complete retention of the doctrine of immunity
when the proposition is phrased in these terms.

IV
THE

LIMITS OF GOVERNMENTAL LIABILITY

Before we accept a change of philosophy, it is necessary to determine whether the reasons given for the present doctrine merit substantial consideration. If valid reasons exist for granting immunity, corrective legislation must take them into account. At the outset, it should
be noted that almost no court attempts directly to state a reason for the
common assertion that the municipal corporation is not liable for torts
arising out of the performance of those functions -called governmental.
The reason seems to rest in the antiquity and frequent reiteration of
the assertion. Usually the reason must be determined indirectly by
examining the criteria which the court uses in distinguishing governmental functions from proprietary functions. Insofar as a certain
criterion is used as a basis for classifying the particular function as
governmental, it must be understood as a reason for granting immunity
to the municipality. Only infrequently does the court attempt a direct
44 BBVERIDGB, UNBMPLOYMBNT,

A

PROBLEM OF lliDUSTRY,

c. 1 (1931).
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justification of the underlying principle. Those statements which do
purport to justify the immunity of the state have their origin in the
maxim "The King can do no wrong." The concept of sovereignty and
the prerogative of the king seem to lie at the root of the spreading tree
of governmental irresponsibility.45 So eminent a jurist as Justice Holmes
has denied that immunity of the sovereign is solely a result of a misconception of history. "A sovereign is exempt from suit," he said,
"not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the
logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against
the authority that makes the law on which the right depends."40 I
shall not dwell on this justification. It is clear that it does not reach
the heart of the problem of determining whether the government has
caused harm for which compensation should be made. It merely asserts
that since the government makes the rules to what conduct is wrong,
. its own conduct cannot be wrong. To such fiction, I cannot subscribe.
There is another justification for immunity which is frequently
expressed. It is the argument that if the municipality is made liable
for the torts of its agents it will interfere with the proper carrying
out of municipal functions. 47 Thus, it may be argued that if the city
is liable for each false arrest made by its police officers, it will lead
officers to be unduly timid with a resultant lax enforcement of the law.
If this conclusion were sound, it would furnish some justification for
immunity. It is not clear, however, just why municipal operations will
be hampered. 48 It would seem that the imposition of liability for torts
would tend in just the opposite direction-to lead to a more careful
selection of public officials. In a recent New York case,49 a policeman, though reprimanded three times_for excessive drinking, was kept

as

4 5 Professor Borchard's able research leaves little room for doubt on this score. 34
YALE L.J. 1, 129, 229 (1924-5); 36 YALE L.J. 1, 757, 1039 (1926-27); 28 CoL. L. RBv.
577 (1928).
46 Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349 at 353, 27 S. Ct. 526 (1907). See also
The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419 at 433, 42 S. Ct. 159 (1922).
47 Coolidge v. Brookline, 114 Mass. 592 (1874). In the leading case of Russell v.
Men of Devon, 2 T.R. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788) the court stated that it is better
that an individual should sustain an injury than that the public should suffer an inconvenience.
48 In many cases, where the city seeks to reimburse an official who has been subjected
to personal liability or to employ counsel to defend such official, the opposite conclusion is
,reached. Thus, in Cullen v. Carthage, 103 Ind. 196 at 200, 2 N.E. 571 (1885) the court
concluded: ''If it should be understood that the marshall of the town is left without support
from the governing body, to defend himself against all manner of suits that might be instituted against him, the vicious and violent might, by a succession of annoying suits against
him, greatly cripple the enforcement of the ordinances."
49 McCrink v. City of New York, 296 N.Y. 99, 71 N.E. (2d) 419 (1947).
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on the force, and while off duty and intoxicated, killed an innocent
resident of the community. In imposing liability, the court declared
that the city "may not with impunity retain in service an employee
from whose retention danger to others may reasonably be anticipated."50
Will such holding lead to deterioration of the police force? It is more
likely that the potential liability thus imposed will operate to compel
the discharge of dangerous or incompetent individuals. Indeed, in the
long run, imposition of community responsibility would probably compel the citizenry to take a more active interest in municipal affairs generally. If so, better and not poorer government will result.
A third attempted justi:6.cation rests upon the proposition that since
the city derives no :6.nancial return from its governmental functions, it
may not therefore pay any claims for harm resulting from them. In
many cases, the absence of any revenue and pro:6.t is emphasized as a
reason for classifying the function as governmental with a resulting immunity. 51 There may be instances of governmental subdivisions which
are devoid of any assets or power to obtain money.52 But is absence
of pro:6.t a reason for denying responsibility? It would seem the greater
political unit which is conducting its affairs through the medium of
that subdivision should assume responsibility.53 No one would suggest
that the private individual should be responsible for negligent driving·
only when he is driving on an errand which will net him a pro:6.t or at
least some revenue. Liability results equally from the careless driving
of a commercial truck or of a pleasure car. The delivery boy and the
Sunday driver are treated equally. The community derives equal bene:6.t from the pro:6.t-making water works and from the police force. As
a justi:6.cation for immunity, the distinction is unsound.
Courts sometimes distinguish between those powers exercised for
the bene:6.t of the general public and those exercised for the local bene:6.t
50 296 N.Y. 99 at 106.
51 Cases are numerous. See 38 AM. Jon., Mun. Corps. §575.
52Russell v. Men of Devon, 2 T.R. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788).
53 Cf. Bernardine v. City of New York, 294 N.Y. 361, 62 N.E. (2d) 604 (1945)
where the court denies that the state by waiving its own immunity and that of its civil
subdivisions has possibly laid itself open to responsibility for the wrongs of employees of
the subdivision. The court states that "any viewpoint of that kind would be vain, since the
argumentation that had been contrived as a front for the doctrine of governmental immunity
did not survive the renouncement of that doctrine." Id. at 366. In other words, the court
says that while the city may have been said to be acting as agent of the state in performing
governmental duties, that statement was but a cloak to shelter the city within the state's
immunity. When the immunity is gone, the fictional cloak disappears. But see Sanders v.
,State, 76 N.Y.S. (2d) 817 at 819 (1947) " ••• our jurisprudence may yet spread the ever
widening waiver of governmental immunity from tort liability to the point where the State
will be held to answer in damages for the acts of the employees of its civil divisions."
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of the city. A complete answer as to the validity of such a distinction_
is made by Professor Borchard, who says: "The fact is that all functions
performed by a municipality are for the public benefit, otherwise they
could hardly be undertaken with public funds or by public officers.
And it would seem to make little difference whether the group in whose
name the officer acts or speaks is large or small...." 54
One final argument should be noted. It is frequently urged that
in the exercise of judicial or discretionary functions the city should not
be liable, whereas the negligent performance of ministerial functions
should result in liability.55 Here is the first premise which has an element of validity.
No society, so far as I am informed, has yet assumed the role of
an insurer against all harm resulting from the turning of the wheels
of government. When the city council determines that food which is
unfit for human ~onsumption must be destroyed, someone may suffer
a loss, and few would suggest that in thus acting to preserve the health
of the citizenry the municipality must pay for the destruction. When
the city council reasonably determines that a zoning ordinance is required to foster proper mµnicipal development and to prevent the
onset of slum areas, few would say that the city must grant compensation to all those who may suffer loss. But those activities are nothing
mo~e than a determination of legislative policy, familiar examples of
the police power, and, within the bounds of constitutional restrictions,
that activity must be substantially unfettered. The actual process of
legislating means, in part at least, determining the goals which will best
serve the community as a whole, and the methods of achieving those
goals. That is the obligation of the legislative body. It owes no duty
to the individual except as the individual comprises part of the community. It may well be suggested, therefore, that no liability should
ensue merely from the basic governmental actiori of determining legislative policy.56 Quite different, however, is the case in which, after
the city council determines that the existence of a particular condition
i~ dangerous to public health, an over~zealous, an incompetent, or a
L.J.

54 34 YALB
55 Many cases

129 at 136 (1924).
espousing this distinction are collected in 6 McQmLLIN, MUNICIPAL
CoIU>oRA'IloNs, 2nd ed., c. 53, §2799 (1928). ,
56 The term "discretionary function" is thus used here as synonymous with "legislative
policy determination." It must be confessed that it is not always so narrowly construed in
the cases which apply the distinction. See, e.g., Hines v. Charlotte, 72 Mich. 278, 40 N.W.
--333 (1888) (failure to enforce ordinance held to be discretionary function); Rehmann v.
· Des Moines, 204 Iowa 798, 215 N.W. 957 (1927) (wrongful revocation of building license
classified as discretionary function).
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vengeful inspector destroys property in the guise of carrying out the
legislative policy. Here the actual activity does not further, but rather
hinders, interests of the community. Here a loss is suffered not in support of the will of the community, but because the person selected to
enforce the will of the community acted negligently or perhaps wilfully
to harm a member. Here, liability should be clear.57
Closely allied to the distinction between discretionary and nondiscretionary activities is another distinction sometimes referred to by
the courts. It is a distinction between discretionary and mandatory
powers. Some courts will impose liability where the city has failed
to exercise a "mandatory" power. Thus, where the charter grants a
power to the municipality which can be said to impose a duty on the
city to act, the city may be liable for a failure to act. Such mandatory
obligations are thus subsumed under the category "non-discretionary
functions" since the city cannot be said to be able to exercise discretion
about something which the state has directed it to perform.58 In some
cases, however, it has been held that when the mandatory duty relates
to a "governmental function" the liability of the city is limited to failure
to act, and it will not be liable for negligence in performing the duty. 59
Indeed, some cases indicate that if the duty to act is imposed by the
legislature, that is reason in itself for granting immunity to the city for
negligent performance. 60
Of all the lines thus drawn by the courts in support of municipal
immunity, 61 then, only one constitutes a legitimate boundary which
may be established in fixing the area of governmental responsibility.
There may be, however, "inarticulate major premises" which also con57 Judicial opinion is otherwise. It is a legislative matter to decide to build a city
hospital, but it is not a legislative matter to place a patient of a city hospital in such a
position that he contracts smallpox and dies. Yet the city is immune. Shawnee v. Jeter,
96 Okla. 272, 221 P. 758 (1923). It is a legislative matter to decide whether the streets
should be sprinkled, but it is not a legislative matter to operate the sprinkler negligently.
Yet the city is immune. McCrary v. Rome, 29 Ga; App. 384, 115 S.E. 283 (1923). It is
a legislative matter to decide whether garbage collection shall be undertaken, but it is not
a legislative matter to run the garbage wagon into a ladder injuring a workman. Yet the
city is immune. Behrmann v. St. Louis, 273 Mo. 578, 201 S.W. 547 (1918).
·
5 8 Johnston v. Chicago, 258 ill. 494, 101 N.E. 960 (1913); Consolidated Apartment
House Co. v. Baltimore, 131 Md. 523, 102 A. 920 (1917); Springfield Fire & Marine Ins.
Co. v. Keeseville, 148 N.Y. 46, 42 N.E. 405 (1895).
59 Wooster v. Arbenz, 116 Ohio St. 281, 156 N.E. 210 (1927). Cf., however, Harlan
v. Parsons, 202 Ky. 358, 259 S.W. 717 (1924).
60 See 34 HARv. L. REv. 66 (1920).
6l The reasons discussed do not by any means represent all of the distinctions which
courts have made, but it is believed that they do substantially cover the basic criteria which
have been advanced.
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stitute boundaries, and which require attention in determining a statutory basis for liability of the municipality. I should consider that a second boundary to be established in imposing tort liability must be this:
a liability which is reasonably likely to result in municipal bankruptcy
must be avoided. 62 One might go further: if there is any substantial
possibility that imposing liability for a particular loss will bankrupt the
city and cause cessation of all its services, then such liability must be
avoided. 63 I am thinking now, for example, of imposing liability for
:6.re loss resulting, perhaps, from a failure of the municipal :6.re department. 64 A conflagration might cause losses the paymept of which would
bankrupt the community. It has been suggested that such danger "is
more apparent than real" 65 and it has also been suggested that we actually have no statistical data from which to make a determination.66
We must either speculate or :6.nd the facts, and I thoroughly agree with
Professor Lloyd when he urges that state legislative bodies are peculiarly fitted to make both the factual and policy determinations which
are necessary preliminaries to establishment of a boundary for the area
of liability which will properly safeguard the continuity of municipal
services. 67
While I am inclined to believe that the limits suggested above, that
is, limits which will preserve freedom of legislative policy determination
and which will insure the continuity of municipal services, would be
sufficient, I am not prepared to say that a third limitation should not be
considered. It is this: a limitation which will relieve the city from liability in s?me cases of non-feasance as distinguished from misfeasance.
62 See Lloyd, "Municipal Tort Liability in New York-A Legislative Challenge," 23
N.Y.Umv.L.Q. 278 (1948).
63 Alternatively, a method must be devised which will spread the cost and the risk of
such loss so that imposing liability will not cause the cessation of services. Perhaps the
state could assume responsibility above certain amounts. Perhaps insurance programs could
be devised to build reserves for such disasters as may occasionally arise.
64 The danger of extensive loss in this instance has led many courts to extend immunity
to the city. E.g., Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Keeseville, 148 N.Y. 46, 42 N.E.
405 (1895); Steitz v. Beacon, 295 N.Y. 51, 64 N.E. (2d) 704 (1945); Hughes v. State,
252 App. Div. 263, 299 N.Y.S. 387 (1937). There is an additional reason why liability
should not be assumed for fire losses, even when the inefficiency or negligence of municipal
agents is a causal factor. Private insurance against such loss is readily available at a cost
y.,hich is generally not prohibitive for the individual owner.
In considering whether potential risk would endanger municipal finances, one might
wonder whether the assumption of liability from damage resulting from mob violence would
not constitute a heavy potential risk. Yet, such risk has not prevented the passage of numerous statutes assuming such liability.
'
65 Warp, ''Tort Liability Problems of Small Municipalities," 9 I.Aw AND CoNTl!M.
PRoB. 363 at 366 (1942).
.
66 Lloyd, "Le Roi est Mort: Vive le Roi," 24 N.Y.UNIV.L.Q. 38 (1949).
67 See supra, n. 63.
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Such a distinction is difficult to make, 68 and if adopted might lead to
an empirical treatment akin to that achieved under the governmentalproprietary dichotomy. It seems clear to me that if the city has been
given discretionary power to establish, for example, a sewer system, no
liability should result merely because the council chooses to refrain
from exercising its discretion. Immunity in such case would B.ow from
the limitation first suggested above-a limitation that would exclude
liability for conducting the basic legislative process. It is equally clear
to me that certai:r;i kinds of non-feasance should result in liability. For
example, if the street department negligently fails to act to replace a
red traffic light, and an accident occurs as a result, liability should
follow. 60 But I am not so certain that the city should be liable for a loss
resulting from a burglary, even though it could be demonstrated that
the burglary would have been prevented had the police department
assigned two patrolmen to the area rather than one and that any reasonable care in the police department would have resulted in the assignment of two men. 70 A failure to give police protection may under those
circumstances be regarded as negligent omission, yet I hesitate to assert
that the city should pay the loss. 71
I can only suggest that when legislative action is contemplated,
such a boundary to the area of liability must be considered.
There is, of course, a final boundary which must be marked. It
consists of procedural safeguards to the city. Unless the city is to be
imposed upon by stale claims, without any adequate opportunity to
make a reasonably prompt investigation of alleged harms, requirements
for giving notice to the city must be established. 72 The malingering
claimant must be identified and thwarted. Perhaps administrative machinery for prompt non-judicial settlement of minor claims will be
required. 73 Perhaps a special court must be established to avoid pas68

Moore, "Misfeasance and Non-Feasance in the Liability of Public Authorities," 30

L. Q. Rav. 276, 415 (1914).
6 9 In New York, after a statute waived the governmental immunity, the state was held
liable when the state traffic commission failed to replace a light.
70 Cf. the reluctance of the New York court to impose liability upon New York City
for failure to supply adequate police protection to prevent injury during a-melee occurring
at a municipal pier. Murrain v. Wilson Line and New York City, 270 App. Div. 372, 59
N.Y.S. (2d) 750 (1946), affd. 296 N.Y. 845, 72 N.E. (2d) 29 (1947).
71 How far my reluctance is a result of a long conditioning process from reading assertions that failure of police protection is not a basis for liability because that is a governmental
function, I cannot determine. Perhaps, also, I am influenced by the ease with which the
individual may secure commercial insurance at reasonable cost72 See suggested statutes in Borchard, "Proposed State and Local Statutes Imposing
Public Liability in Tort," 9 LAw AND CoNTEM. PROB. 282 at 299 (1942).
73 David and French, "Public Tort Liability Administration: Organization, Methods,
and Expense," 9 LAw AND CoNTEM. PROB. 348 (1948); Fuller and Casner, "Municipal
Tort Liability in Operation," 54 HAnv. L. Rav. 437 (1941).
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sible jury prejudice, or else liability must be limited to actual damages. 74
Those are but details which must not be avoided or ignored if the
pendulum is not to swing from the side of excessive irresponsibility
to the side of excessive expenditures. They are details, however, which
must be developed elsewhere and tailored to the individual needs of
the community. ·

V
CONCLUSION

With the ever-increasing scope of municipal government activities,
the possibilities of harm to the individual are correspondingly greater.
The present legal doctrines which purport to define the area within
which the municipality shall make recompense to the individual harmed
are inadequate in at least-two respects. First, they fail to achieve even
-an approximate degree of consistency in application because the distinction between governmental and proprietary functions is not founded
upon any inherent quality pf the various activities, but rather is generally used as a means of expressing a conclusion that immunity or
liability should result in a particular situation. Second, the doctrines,
as applied, do not correspond to current ideas of justice because they
require the individuals who are harmed to bear a disproportionate part
of the cost of enterprises undertaken for the benefit of the entire community. Adequate reformation can be achieved only by legislation.
Legislation, like an efficient incinerator, can destroy completely the
effect of the decisions which now perpetuate the doctrine of immunity.
It must be legislation which will shift the basic approach to the problem; instead of having a general governmental immunity with certain
exceptions, a gen~ral governmental responsibility with limited exceptions is needed. Those exceptions are to be determined not by reference
to an outmoded dogma that ''The' King can do no wrong," but by
reference to social interests which will be served by granting immunity. I have suggested what seem to me to be the fundamental interests to be
protected by granting immunity: the preservation of freedom to determine policy; the preservation of continuity of municipal services; and
possibly, the preservation of some discretionary power in mU!licipal
officials to refrain from taking affirmative action even though particular
individuals may demand'it; The list may be incomplete, but it may be
sufficient to stimulate a realistic redetermination of the area in which
municipalities are to assume responsibility for their torts.
74 Fuller and Casner, "Municipal Tort Liability in Operation," 54 HAnv. L. Riw.
437 (1941).
-

